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FAIR REPRESENTATION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT
IN SECTION 301 EMPLOYEE-UNION SUITS:
WHO'S WATCHING THE BACK DOOR?
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act' has
provided both unions2 and employers3 with a federal forum4 for
suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Initial furor as
to whether the section merely provided federal jurisdiction for
the application of state law, or instead was enacted to allow
federal judges to apply federal common law, has gradually
subsided, as the latter view has gained prevalence. 5
In recent years it has also become settled that section 301
empowers an employee to bring suit against his employer for
breach of contractually-created employee rights. 6 The courts
have not, however, definitively resolved the question which is the
subject of this Comment: whether section 301(a) also provides
jurisdiction for an employee suit against a union for breach of
contract. Of course, such a suit can arise under the section only
in those comparatively rare situations in which a union breaches
a covenant it made with an employer, by which it conferred
third-party beneficiary rights upon employees. Such provisions
arise relatively infrequently for the obvious reason that the norm
in collective bargaining is for management to extract promises
redounding directly to its own benefit, rather than to bargain
altruistically on behalf of its employees. Within the fairly narrow
'Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.., or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties ....
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). "
2See, e.g., Retail Clerks Local 1222 v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 327 F.2d 442 (9th Cir.
1964); United Steelworkers v. Copperweld Steel Co., 230 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
3 See, e.g., Electrical Contractors Ass'n v. Local 103, IEW, 458 F.2d 590 (1st Cir.
1972); Shirley-Herman Co. v. Hod Carriers Local 210, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950).
4 State courts do retain concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate § 301 claims. Amalga-
mated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 298 (1970); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962).
Absent § 301 jurisdiction, collective bargaining enforcement would be relegated to
state forums, where its efficacy would depend entirely upon the adequacy of state
remedies. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
6 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
If the collective bargaining agreement provides for compulsory and binding griev-
ance procedures, an employee must of course first exhaust those contractual remedies.
An employee who has done so unsuccessfully will be denied judicial review of his claim
unless he can demonstrate that his union failed to fairly represent his interests. See, e.g.,
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). If the employee can prove that the union
breached its duty of fair representation, see text accompanying notes 60-67 infra, he may
obtain relief against both it and his employer. See, e.g., 386 U.S. at 187-88.
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class of cases in which a union makes third-party promises to its
employees, however, the employee need for a federal forum is
no less compelling than in any breach of contract case between
union and management.
7
A case which recently confronted the Ninth Circuit, Buzzard
v. Machinists Local 1040,8 illustrates employee desire for access to
federal court in a breach of contract suit against his union. In
Buzzard, several employees ignored the instructions of their
union officials and crossed the picket lines of a second union
involved in a strike against a common employer. Subsequently,
upon the termination of that labor dispute, a written strike
settlement agreement9 between the first union and the employer
provided that neither would initiate proceedings for damages or
other relief in any forum for any cause arising out of the labor
dispute. 10 The union reneged on its promise and instituted
internal disciplinary proceedings against its employees for their
refusal to honor the picket line.
When the employees instituted suit in federal court to enjoin
the pending disciplinary proceedings, the Ninth Circuit noted
their failure to exhaust intraunion remedies and dismissed the
case. In expansive dictum, however, it suggested that federal
courts have jurisdiction in such suits under section 301.11 The
court reasoned simplistically: it began with the proposition that
section 301 empowers federal courts to entertain suits for viola-
tions of contracts between an employer and a union. 12 The court
then concluded that section 301(a) supported an employee suit
for redress of union interference with employee collective bar-
gaining rights when such interference constituted a breach of the
7 Provision of a federal forum for the enforcement of private labor contracts was
motivated in part by fear of antiunion sentiment in state courts, and by concern at the
inadequacy of state remedies. See Textile workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957). Even if state antiunionism might be less prejudicial where the union's adversary is
an employee, not an employer-a dubious assumption-the absence of a federal forum
could still preclude employees from obtaining remedies appropriate to their injuries. It
would mean also that the accumulated experience of federal courts in employer-union
contract suits would be lost to all parties. Cf. id.
8 480 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1973).
9 In Retail Clerks Local 128 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 25-28 (1962), the
Court rejected the notion that the term "contract" as used in § 301(a) denoted only full
collective bargaining agreements establishing wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment. Instead, it found any agreement "significant to the maintenance of
labor peace between" employers and labor organizations-including strike settlement
agreements between an employee and a minority union-to be a "contract" within the
meaning of § 301(a).
10 The agreement stated:
Northwest Airlines and the IAM, their members and their officers, will not
initiate any further actions or proceedings in any court or before any agency or
in any other forum seeking damages or any other relief for any claim or cause
arising out of the circumstances of the strike . . ..
480 F.2d at 38.
"Id. at 40.
12 Id.
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union's duty of fair representation.'" Suggesting that the ques-
tion whether an employee could sue his union for breach of
contract under section -301(a) was one of first impression, 14 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that precedent supported the inference
that the section provided federal jurisdiction for an employee
suit against a union when the union arbitrarily and in bad faith
refused to honor promises made in collective bargaining agree-
ments, since such refusal would constitute a breach of the duty
of fair representation.
The Ninth Circuit's Buzzard decision appears to have been
arrived at by an erroneous reading of jurisdictional case law and
a faulty analysis of the duty of fair representation. These two
separate errors by a court of some distinction illustrate the
elusiveness of these basic jurisdictional and representational is-
sues, and provide convenient points of departure for an analysis
of both section 301 and the duty of fair representation.
I. , ECTION 301 AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
The first error of the Buzzard court-its conclusion that
section 3 01 by itself conferred jurisdiction over fair representa-
tion suits-may have been partly academic, 15 but nonetheless
illustrated dangerously imprecise judicial reasoning.' 6 For if a
fair representation action were appropriate in the Buzzard
context, 17 such an action would necessarily have arisen under the
federal labor statutes, not under section 301. Section 301, prop-
erly analyzed, appears to support jurisdiction only for breach of
contract suits.
A. Fair Representation Jurisdiction Under Section 301
The duty of fair representation arises by implication from
the exclusive representation provisions of federal labor
statutes.' 8 Accordingly, the Supreme Court noted in Vaca v.
Sipes 9 that when employer and union are bound by a collective
bargaining agreement, it was "well established" that a union had
not a contractual but "a statutory duty fairly to represent all of
13 The court cited Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1964) for this
proposition. But see notes 33-41 infra & accompanying text.14 But see notes 42-48 infra & accompanying text.
15 That is, if a fair representation suit were the proper vehicle for employee redress,
federal jurisdiction could be found before the federal courts albeit not under § 301.
16 The court could easily have adopted the theory that an arbitrary refusal to honor
contractual promises was a hybrid fair representation-breach of contract wrong which
could give rise to jurisdiction under either the representation statutes or § 301. The court
did not so reason, however, but instead assumed that any fair representation suit
involving a collective bargaining agreement could be brought under § 301.
17But see notes 49-92 infra & accompanying text.
18 See notes 62-67 infra & accompanying text.
19386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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[its] . .. employees in its enforcement of the . .. collective
bargaining agreement ...[and] that [plaintiff's fair represen-
tation] complaint alleged a breach by the Union of a duty
grounded in federal statutes .... ",20 Thus, authority to sue for
breach of the duty of representation ordinarily flows from those
statutes, which predate the jurisdictional provisions relating to
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.'
Section 301 has provided jurisdiction for fair representation
suits, however, when such suits have been annexed to section 301
breach of contract suits against employers, since, in the latter,
proof 'of defective union representation is a prerequisite to
obtaining relief against the employer.2 2 Loose judicial dictum
may have created some confusion as to this matter 23 and inti-
mated that-since fair representation suits routinely involve col-
lective bargaining contracts-section 301 jurisdiction could be
obtained even without allegations of breach of contract. None of
the three cases cited by the Buzzard court, however, supports that
jurisdictional view. Humphrey v. Moore,24 for example, involved
allegations of breach of contract against both employer and
union, and a claim that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman2 5 involved a claim that
2 0 Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
21 Considerable debate has centered on whether a violation of the duty of" fair
representation also constitutes an unfair labor practice properly dealt with by the Board
itself, rather than by state or federal courts. Compare Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (union's racially discriminatory practices violated §
8(b)(1)(A)), with NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (arbitrary union
action did not violate §§ 8(b)(1)-(2)).
Whatever the ultimate outcome of that controversy, the Court has clearly rejected
the view that adoption of that theory would trigger the pre-emption doctrine enunciated
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and thus give the
Board exclusive jurisdiction over all duty of fair representation questions except those
linked to a § 301 breach of contract claim. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176-88 (1967).
Thus, federal courts appear likely to retain jurisdiction over duty of fair representation
questions.
Currently, duty of fair representation questions will be heard before the Board only
under limited circumstances. The Board may, for example, act to decertify unions who
refuse to discharge that duty. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1970); see, e.g. A.O. Smith
Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957).2 2 See note 6 supra. See also Pelofsky & Pelofsky, Employee's Rights Under The National
Labor Relations Act, 32 Mo. L. REV. 211, 227-28 (1967).
Thus, because the necessary nexus with a companion suit against the employer was
lacking, Buzzard could dearly have not been brought as a fair representation action under
§ 301.
23 In Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1970), for
example, the Court declared that § 301 would support
a suit in the state courts by a union member against his union that seeks to
redress union interference with rights conferred on individual employees by the
employer's promises in the collective-bargaining agreement, where it is proved that
such interference constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation.
Id. at 299 (emphasis added), citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1963). Yet in
Humphrey it was made dear by the Court that the union interference did not constitute
such a breach. 375 U.S. at 351.
24 375 U.S. 335 (1963). See text accompanying notes 33-41 infra.
25 345 U.S. 335 (1952).
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an employer's grant of special seniority to workers with pre-
employment military service violated employee rights and an
allegation that the union's acquiescence in that provision
breached its duty of fair representation. Finally, Falsetti v. Local
2026, UMW,26 was a routine action against both employer and
union for alleged breach of contractual seniority provisions in
which the union was also charged with having breached its duty
of fair representation.
B. Employee Breach of Contract Suits
Although section 301 does not provide jurisdiction for fair
representation suits, it apparently does furnish jurisdiction for
employee breach of contract suits against unions. On its face, 
2 7
the statute does not specify who may sue to enforce contractual
provisions between unions and employers. In Smith v. Evening
News Association,28 however, the Supreme Court held that section
301 used the word "between" to refer to contracts between em-
ployers and unions, not to suits between them, and thus that
section 301 permitted employees to sue to "vindicate individ-
ual employee rights arising from a collective bargaining con-
tract .. -"9 Although Smith dealt only with employee-employer
suits, its simple logic seems to compel the conclusion that indi-
vidual employees ought to be permitted to sue their unions in
vindication of the same rights.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of section 301(a) is
inconclusive on this point,30 and fails to reveal whether Congress
contemplated that employees would have resort to the federal
courts in such suits. Proponents of section 301 were primarily
concerned with affording employers a federal remedy for union
misconduct,3' while its opponents railed against the antiunion
sentiment evidenced by establishment of this employer remedy.
32
With attention focused on the merits of employer-union suits,
the issue of employee access to the federal courts received scant
consideration.
26355 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1966).
27See note 1 supra.
28371 U.S. 195 (1962).
291d. at 200.
30 A search of the Congressional Record reveals only one comment of even arguable
relevance, in which Congressman Barden indicated his understanding that § 301 con-
templated not only damage suits, but also the possibility that interested employees might
bring suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act to secure dedarations of contractual
rights. 93 CONG. REC. 3656 (1947).
The legislative history of § 301 is well compiled in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485-546 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (appendix).
21 See 93 CONG. REc. 4207 (1947) (remarks of Senator Morse).
"2 See 92 CONG. REc. 5412-15 (1946) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
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1. Humphrey v. Moore
One ambiguous decision of the Supreme Court may, how-
ever, have already recognized-albeit tacitly-the right of an
employee to sue his union under section 301 for breach of a
labor contract. In Humphrey v. Moore,33 a single collective bar-
gaining agreement binding several employers and several local
unions provided, inter alia, that in the event one employer
absorbed the business of another the seniority of the absorbed or
affected employees would be determined by mutual agreement
between the employer and the affected union.34 It stipulated, in
addition, that grievances were to be processed initially by the
employer and the local. If unresolved at that level, they would be
submitted to a local joint committee, and if no settlement were
agreed upon there the grievances were to be further forwarded
to a "Joint Conference Committee," whose decisions would be
final and binding on all parties.
The contractual dispute in Humphrey arose when two em-
ployers, E & L Transport Company (E & L) and Dealers Trans-
port Compay (Dealers) were notified by Ford Motor Company
that a decrease in auto sales meant that one of them could no
longer be employed to transport Ford cars from Louisville to
points south. E & L agreed to abandon its franchise, in return
for a reciprocal concession by Dealers at a northern plant.
Facing imminent layoff, E & L employees filed grievances
pursuant to the seniority- merger provision of their collective
bargaining agreement. They demanded that their seniority be
"dovetailed" or "sandwiched" with that of Dealers' employees, so
that employees from either company with the least seniority
would be the first to be discharged. The Joint Conference
Committee agreed that sandwiching was the most equitable solu-
tion to the seniority issue,3 5 and thereby triggered a suit by
Dealers employees who sought to enjoin implementation of the
Committee's decision.
In their complaint, the Humphrey plaintiffs alleged discharge
without just cause on two grounds. First, they alleged, there had
been no "absorption" of an employer within the contractual
meaning of that term, and thus the Joint Conference Committee
had exceeded its authority under the collective bargaining
agreement by resolving the seniority question. Thus, they
reasoned, the Committee's resolution was void, plaintiffs were
entitled to retain their original seniority, and their discharge was
without good cause.36 Second, plaintiffs alleged that the
33 375 U.S. 335 (1964).34 Id. at 338.
3 5 1d. at 339.
'61d. at 342.
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Committee's agreement was void because the union had
breached its ddty of fair representation. Accordingly, they
reasoned, their original seniority remained intact and their dis-
charge was again without cause.
37
On the basis of the complaint, the Court ruled Humphrey
arose "under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and
[was] . .. controlled by federal law .... 38 On the merits, the
Court concluded that "[n]either the parties nor the Joint Comr
mittee exceeded their power under the contract and there was
no fraud or breach of duty by the exclusive bargaining agent. 39
Never clearly explicated, however, was why the Court has juris-
diction over each defendant.
The Humphrey Court may have bottomed its finding of
section 301 jurisdiction on either of two grounds. First, it may
have held only that the plaintiffs' first allegation established a
section 301(a) cause of action against the employer for breach of
contract-wrongful discharge-and that their second allegation
supported an annexed suit against the union for dereliction of its
representation duty.40 It is equally reasonable, however, to
theorize that the Court found the plaintiffs' first allegation to
have established breach of contract jurisdiction over both em-
ployer and union, the union's breach having occurred when
union representatives on the Joint Committee exceeded their
power and decided an issue outside their proper jurisdiction.41
At no point did the Court intimate that an employee-union
breach of contract suit was improper.
2. Lower Court Unanimity
The Supreme Court's recognition of section 301 jurisdiction
for employee-union breach of contract suits in Humphrey was at
3 7 
Id.8 1d. at 343-44 (footnote omitted).
39 1d. at 351.
40 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
41 Comment, Refusal To Process A Grievance, The NLRB And The Duty Of Fair Represen-
tation: A Plea for Preemption, 26 U. Pirr. L. REv. 593, 610 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Refusal To Process A Grievance].
The union could arguably have breached a promise implicit in agreed-upon griev-
ance procedures that the union would fairly represent all bargaining unit workers. See
Ferguson, Duty Of Fair Representation, 15 LAB. L.J. 596 (1964); Comment, Union's Duty To
Fairly Represent Its Mem.bers in Contract Grievance Procedures-The Impact of Vaca v. Sipes, 19
SYRACUSE L. REv. 66, 72 (1967); Refusal To Process A Grievance, supra, at 611.
Such a theory, however, falters under analysis. A study of the case law reveals no
recognition of it. The duty of fair representation is statutorily imposed, see notes 62-67
infra & accompanying text, and § 301(a) supports fair representation actions only when
properly appended to a breach of contract suit against the employer, see Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, at 186-87.
For a discussion of the only Supreme Court case referring to the Humphrey holding,
see note 23 supra.
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best implicit. The federal courts that have considered the ques-
tion have also unanimously recognized this jurisdictional right.
In Bryant v. International Union, UMW,42 for example, the
relevant collective bargaining agreement gave the union a right
to demand that the company comply with specified safety regula-
tions. Disgruntled employees alleged that the provision obligated
the union to enforce compliance, and sued the union for breach
of the labor contract as well as for breach of its duty of fair
representation. While deciding on the merits against the em-
ployees, the Sixth Circuit implicitly acknowledged their right to
sue the union under section 301(a) for breach of contract.43
Similarly, in Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding
Company,4 a collective bargaining agreement had empowered a
Joint Conference Committee of management and union rep-
resentatives to resolve seniority problems arising from employer
mergers. Nonetheless, the Committee refused to entertain em-
ployee requests for the dovetailing of seniority subsequent to the
failure of one of the employers. The plaintiffs alleged that the
union breached its duty of fair representation, and that both
union and management breached the collective bargaining
agreement, in refusing to entertain the grievance in Com-
mittee. The Third Circuit intimated that section 301(a) confer-
red jurisdiction for breach of contract suits against their union
by employees simply because the seniority rights in controversy.
arose from a collective bargaining contract, and held the Com-
mittee obligated to entertain the seniority question.
Finally,45 in Bey v. Muldoon,46 employees sued to enforce
collective bargaining agreement provisions which established a
fund, to be administered jointly by the union and the employer,
for the benefit of sugar workers who had lost employment
opportunities as a result of technological innovations in the
industry. The employees alleged that both union and manage-
ment had breached the labor contract by making disbursements
from the fund to workers not involved in sugar production.
Denying a motion to dismiss, a Pennsylvania district court de-
clared that section 301(a) jurisdiction lay for an employee breach
of contract suit against the union, explaining that if an employer
42 467 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S., Feb. 20, 1973).43 See id. at 3. The court assumed without deciding that the employee had standing to
sue for breach of contract, id. at 2 n. 1. It must be borne in mind that the issue of standing
is preliminary to and wholly distinct from the question whether employee breach oT
contract suits fall within § 301's jurisdictional provisions.
44 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
45 Other cases supporting § 301 jurisdiction for employee-union breach of contract
suits include Abruscato v. Industrial Workers Local 199, 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,955 at
22,547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Lee v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 271 F. Supp. 635, 638
(W.D. Va. 1967).
46217 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1963), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 987 (1966).
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is subject to suit "the union, a party to the contract ... [is a]
logical . . . [party] to a suit which will of necessity interpret that
contract. '47 Significantly, the court suggested that Smith v. Eve-
ning News Association4 8 disposed of the contention that section
301 gave an employee no authority to sue his union. Thus, the
Bey court's recognition of jurisdiction cannot fairly be limited to
suits in which, as in Bey, an employer is a codefendant.
II. FAIR REPRESENTATION AND FEDERAL LABOR POLICY
It seems clear that other statutes than section 301 must be
invoked to provide jurisdiction for a fair representation suit. It
seems clear also that section 301 will, on the other hand, suffice
to provide jurisdiction for a breach of contract action. The
question remaining, then, is which type of action is appropriate
on the basis of the Buzzard allegations.
In Jost v. Machinists, Grand Lodge,49 plaintiff, an employee,
alleged breach by his union of a contractual provision which
prohibited it from coercing employees into becoming union
members. He was held to have stated only a claim for breach of
the duty of fair representation, and not a breach of contract
claim cognizable under section 301. Likewise, in Richardson v.
Communications Workers, 50 the relevant collective bargaining
agreement contained covenants by both employer and union not
to discriminate against any employee on the basis of union
affiliation. The Richardson plaintiff, after withdrawing from
union membership, was subjected to continuing harassment by
union members at his jobsite. After a fight with one of his
tormentors, he was discharged by the employer. Thereafter, he
filed a section 301(a) action against both employer and union for
breach of the antidiscrimination clause. The Eighth Circuit
noted that the plaintiff's claim against the union "miscon-
strue[d]" the relationship between the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement. The union, it reasoned, was "signatory to
the agreement on behalf of all the employees," and served "in
the capacity of a fiduciary to the employees." Thus, it declared,
breach of that agreement by the union
created a claim for breach of trust of its statutory duty
to give adequate representation... [not] one arising out
of the collective bargaining contract. . . . [W]hen the
employee seeks individual relief arising from union
discrimination he need only look to the statutory duty
of the union to adequately represent him.
51
47Id. at 406.
48 See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
49 69 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,988, at 25,152 (D. Neb. 1972).
50443 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1971).
51d. at 980-81 (footnote omitted).
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It was in this vein that the Buzzard court assumed that a
union failure to abide by its contractual promises, if tantamount
to "'fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest', 52 would constitute a
traditional breach of the duty of fair representation.
The Richardson assertion that an employee seeking relief for
injury resulting from union contractual misconduct "need only
look to the statutory duty of the union to adequately represent
him" ignores serious policy problems which underlie the
superficially benign Buzzard view. In fact, the duty of fair rep-
resentation should not be invoked unless it can be shown that
union conduct impaired or allowed the impairment of employee
job interests. The contrary Buzzard assumption represents an
expansion of the duty of fair representation which may have
been not only doctrinally unsupportable 53 but unwise. While the
duty ought not be construed stingily,54 the Buzzard court's con-
struction of it could, by importing the law of fair representation
into the breach of contract area, imperil the very goals the duty
was designed to further.
A. The Duty of Fair Representation
As evidenced by sections 8(a)(l)-(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act,55 one major goal of national labor policy has long
been to maximize the rights of individual workers. 56 Prominent
among the rights to be fostered and protected is the right of
employees to band together to organize and concentrate their
economic strength.57 Unions arose in an effort to combine the
minimal economic power of individual employees in a single
The Richardson court's authority is undermined by its casual assertion, id. at 980 n.6,
that Vaca v. Sites, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)-in which the plaintiff employee had asserted no
contractual claim against his union-afforded support for this position. In Vaca, plaintiff
was discharged by his employer because of a heart condition. After the union refused to
pursue the employee's claim of wrongful discharge to final arbitration, he filed suit for
breach of the duty of fair representation 386 U.S. at 174-76. No union breach of
contract, however, was even arguable in the Vaca context.
52 480 F.2d at 40, quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964); Amalga-
mated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971).
5' Past Supreme Court decisions have clearly made reference to fraud as the
standard by which union representation is to be measured. Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 348 (1964), for example, suggested that "substantial evidence of fraud,
deceitful action, or dishonest conduce' was required before breach of the fair representa-
tion dutyi could be found; Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge. 403 U.S.
27,29(1971) voiced identical criteria. See also text accompanying notes 8 1-85 infra.
Neither case, however, dealt in the slightest with the question whether a union's breach of
contract must be "fraudulent" to give rise to relief, or whether in such cases the duty of
fair representation would be the sole source of employee relief.54 hee Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TExAs .REV.
1119, 1177-78 (1973). Ms. Clark suggests that increased union strength vis-a-vis both
management and employees has made expansion of the duty "mandatory," and that
"[tjhe added protection that workers would gain from expanding the duty of fair
representation to forbid irrational action would outweigh the disadvantages to their
unions."
55 29 U.S.C. H§ 158(a)(1)-(5) (1970).5
11 ee id. § 157; cf. McClintock, Enterprise Labor And The Developing Law Of Employee
job Rights: Part One, 8 GONZAGA L. REv. 40, 50 (1972).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
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entity, capable of counterbalancing the economic bargaining
might of employers. Perhaps the foremost function of the union
from the very outset was the protection of individual employees
from employer caprice.
It is inevitable, of course, that over time unions-like all
organizations-may develop interests that diverge from the indi-
vidual interests of their members.58 Such divergence frequently
arises in the administration of a collective bargaining agreement,
where the desire of union and employer to accommodate each
other's interests for the sake of harmony--kdubbed by some the
"spirit of accommodation"-may spell "difficulty for individual
rights of the employees."5 9
Thus it was that the duty of fair representation was given
birth. That duty arose to remedy invidious or hostile union
treatment of its members, 60 and thus to compel the union to
protect employee job interests against impairment by the *em-
ployer. The Supreme Court noted in Vaca v. Sipes61 that, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of employees, a union has a
duty "fairly to represent all of those employees, both in its
collective bargaining ... and in its enforcement of the resulting
collective bargaining agreement ...."
The Supreme Court first enunciated the doctrine of fair
representation in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 62 a suit by
black railroad employees against their union to-enjoin implemen-
tation of a union-negotiated agreement, the provisions of which
restricted hiring and tenure opportunities for blacks as locomo-
tive firemen. The Court noted that section 2(4) of the Railway
Labor Act 63 explicitly empowered a union elected by a majority
of the employees in a collective bargaining unit to represent
exclusively all unit members in collective bargaining. That provi-
sion, however, was found to impose on the union the duty to
represent the interests of all unit members equally.64 The hostil-
ity displayed by the union toward black employees clearly
58 See, e.g., Comment, Federal Protection Of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73
YALE L. 1215 (1964).
59 lumrosen, The Worker And Three Phases Of Unionism: Administrative And Judicial
Control Of The Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MxcH. L. REv. 1435, 1436, 1465 (1963).
A union may, for examlle, choose not to press the valid grievance of an employee
irksome to management, in return for reciprocal consideration from the employer when
a union shop steward runs afoul of work rules. The "spirit of accommodation," by
encouraging an employer to forgo or soften disciplinary measures against the steward,
may coincide with the interests of both employer and union. This coincidence, however,
is at the expense of the employee with a meritorious grievance, who is left adrift by the
union.
60 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301
(1971).
61386 U.S. at 177.
62 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6345 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1970).
64 323 U.S. at 202.
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breached this statutorily-implied duty. In a similar case involving
union discrimination against blacks in the negotiation of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the Court reversed a Fifth Circuit
decision65 and held that section 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act,66 designating a union elected by a bargaining unit
majority as the exclusive agent for that unit, impliedly estab-
lished a union duty of fair representation.67
The courts have expanded the perimeters of the duty of fair
representation to preclude not only hostile discrimination against
racial minorities, but also bad-faith discrimination against any
defined employee group during the negotiation and administra-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement. 68 Thus, if a group of
employees can prove that a ufhion refused in bad faith to
negotiate with management to eliminate differential wage scales
for employees performing essentially similar work, they have
established a breach of the duty of fair representation. 69 Simi-
larly, if an employer abandons one installation for another with a
consequent reduction in the number of available jobs, a union
would breach its duty by approving the employer's use of politi-
cal considerations in choosing one particular group of employees
for the remaining positions. 70 Furthermore, a union may not for
hostile reasons71 undertake discriminatory action against an in-
dividual employee. For example, if it refuses a member's timely
tender of dues and thereafter expels him from membership
because those dues were in arrears, with the result that manage-
ment dismisses the member under union shop provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement,72 the duty has been breached.
B. Limitations on the Duty of Fair Representation
While the duty of fair representation affords important
protection for worker interests, it must be noted that its protec-
tion is neither all-embracing nor all-powerful. It is not all-
embracing because the duty does not ordinarily extend to union
conduct unrelated to the negotiation or administration of a
collective bargaining agreement. It is hardly all-powerful, even
within its proper domain, because it accords a union extraordi-
65 Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 223 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1955).
,6 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
17 Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam).
68 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Gainey v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318, 322-23 (3d Cir. 1963).
"5 See, e.g., Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318, 323 (3d Cir.
1963).
o See, e.g., Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961).
71Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959).
72 Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Del. 1959). For a
full exploration of the contemporary contours of the duty of fair representation, see
Clark, supra note 54.
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narily broad discretion in the discharge of its representation
function.
1. Employee-Employer Relations
It must be noted that however arbitrarily the Buzzard union
acted in reneging upon its promise not to discipline its members,
its threatened disciplinary action in no way bore upon the
negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining
agreement. The union's breached promise did not relate to
its primary function of representing employee interests against
management, but instead involved a purely internal employee-
union matter. It would therefore be preferable to conclude that
the duty of fair representation was not properly involved in
Buzzard.
Exclusion of all intraunion conduct from the duty of fair
representation would defeat the protective aims of that duty, for
"internal union policies and practices may have a substantial
impact upon the external relationships of members of the unit to
their employer. '73 Wrongful union expulsion of a member for
purely "internal" matters, for example, could represent a breach
of the duty of fair representation because it could compel or
simply allow an employer to discharge that member under union
shop provisions.
Nonetheless, a requirement that union misconduct bear
directly -upon the employer-employee relation to constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation has been felt necessary.
The fear has been expressed that otherwise a union would be
"exposed to harassing litigation by dissident members over every
arguable decision made in the course of the day-to-day function-
ing of the union." Thus, though the duty of fair representation
is broad, it does not include union practices without a "substan-
tial impact upon members' rights in relation to the negotiation
and administration of the collective bargaining agreement. '7 4
Wholly apart from the fear of harassing litigation in minor
matters, however, considerations of worker protection and
economic stability militate against resort to the duty of fair
representation to support a Buzzard-type claim.
Application of the fair representation standard ordinarily
71 Retana v. Apartment & El. Op. Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 1972).74
1Id. at 1024-25. See also text accompanying note 59 supra. In Retana, a Spanish-
speaking employee-allegedly discharged without good cause-sued her union for
breach of the duty of fair representation. The plaintiff claimed that her union had failed
to provide her with a translated copy of the labor agreement, supply her with a bilingual
liaison to the union hierarchy, or simply to explain her rights under the contract. The
court held that the plaintiff should be entitled to prove her allegations, since proof that a
minority group was denied enjoyment of collective bargaining rights by its union's
exploitation of a language barrier would represent a breach of the fair representation
duty. 453 F.2d at 1024. Such exploitation would, it should be noted, have permitted the
employer to encroach at will upon her job interests.
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results in the subordination of individual employee interests to
union organizational needs.7 5 This is troubling76 but ultimately
tolerable under a scheme of exclusive representation, so long as
a union is administering a collective bargaining agreement and
specific union promises to its members are not at stake. Unions
should ordinarily be entitled to considerable discretion under
such circumstances, as they should have no overriding interest
apart from the "spirit of accommodation" in aiding an employer.
A union's very ability to represent its members effectively would
only be imperiled by closer judicial scrutiny of asserted employee
rights.
Subordination of employee rights to union organizational
interests becomes unsatisfactory, however, where union breaches
of specific contractual promises bearing solely upon the em-
ployee-union relation are at issue. If a union's breach of such
promises is subjected only to the ordinary fair representation
standard, requiring proof of fraud or like conduct,7 7 a union is
given great latitude to judge its own cause and breach its prom-
ises. Though the employer would in theory be able to bring an
ordinary breach of contract action in which employee rights
could be vindicated without reference to the fair representation
standard, the employer is scarcely charged with or committed to
representation of worker interests.
The Buzzard employees had specific rights conferred upon
them by union promises in the strike settlement agreement, and
should have been able reasonably to rely upon those specific
guarantees. 78 A union's flagrant breach of its promises to its
members, albeit in the name of union solidarity and discipline, is
antithetical to its role as "fiduciary" 79 and exclusive employee
representative. It ought not be subject only to the usual relaxed
test for breach of the duty of fair representation, a test which has
allowed few aggrieved employees to prevail upon the merits.
2. The Fair Representation Standard
Nonetheless, there exist numerous cases in which specific
union promises to members do relate to the negotiation or
" See text accompanying notes 81-91 infra. ,
71 See Clark, supra note 54, noting that the need for union strength may be small
consolation to a discharged employee when the union refuses to take up his grievance,
and that absent judicial supervision of union action "the supposed beneficiaries of union
strength might never see their share of its fruits." Id. 1120-21.77 See note 53 supra.
71 This is not to suggest that a union should be deprived of an opportunity to show
that it had not in fact breached the literal terms of the strike settlement agreement, but
merely that union performance of specific collective bargaining contractual promises
ought to be measured by traditional contract standards, and not by the special fair
representation-bad faith standard which would presumably excuse the great majority of
traditional breaches of contract.
" See text accompanying note 51 supra..
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administration of a collective bargaining agreement, 80 so that
their breach appears to fall within the ambit of the traditional
duty of fair representation. In such cases, the limitations of the
fair representation remedy as it is applied make it imperative
that employees be allowed to pursue independent, traditional
contractual remedies.
The Supreme Court has required, for union conduct to
constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation, that such
conduct be "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,"81 or result
in intentionally severe discrimination unrelated to legitimate
union objectives. 82 Lower court phrasings of the fair representa-
tion standard include "hostile discrimination,
8' 3 "arbitrariness, '8 4
and "bad faith arbitrariness.1
85
Lower courts have been hesitant to find union conduct in
breach of the duty. With the employee required to overcome a
strong presumption of union rectitude,86 unions have fared well
in defending fair representation suits. Less egregious forms of
discrimination and unfairness than raw malice or racial discrimi-
nation have been difficult to establish, with the result that
considerable discretion is vested in the union. Commentators
have long pointed out that employees with legitimate breach of
contract claims against an employer, and legitimate fair rep-
resentation causes of action against their union, have been un-
able to obtain relief against either due to the courts' reluctance to
equate a union's refusal to process a meritorious grievance with
bad faith.
8 8
Persuasive union defenses to an employee's suit in the Buz-
zard context are easy to fabricate and nearly impossible to attack.
The union may, for example, simply argue that it did not
interpret the strike settlement agreement8 9 as precluding fair
disciplinary proceedings against offenders, contending that if its
"'See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
81 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
82 Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971).
"' Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 313 F.2d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 1963).
84 Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
85 Buzzard v. Machinists Local 1040, 480 F.2d 35, 40 (9th Cir. 1973).
86 Local 12, Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 23 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967). Criticizing judicial mishandling of the fair representation doctrine,
the Rubber Workers court concluded: "[C]onfronted with jurisdictional, monetary, and
procedural obstacles, the individual employee may well find his right to fair representa-
tion as enforced by the courts more theoretical than real." Id. at 23.
87 Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement As A Limitation On Union Control Of
Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1055 (1970).
8 Comment, The Duty Of Fair Representation In The Administration Of Grievance Proce-
dures Under Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 437, 451-52. See also
Clark, supra note 54, at 1178 ("In its current muddled state, the duty of fair representa-
tion is not fulfilling Steele's promise. As long as courts nourish the bad-faith standard, the
law cannot assure that minority interests will be considered at any point in the collective
bargaining process.")
89 See note 9 supra.
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interpretation was erroneous, it was arrived at in good faith.
Alternatively, the union might contend that its decision to disci-
pline offenders, albeit in violation of clear contractual agree-
ments, was reasonably necessary to promote union solidarity.
The former defense would require a plaintiff to fathom the
murky evidentiary waters of union motivation; the latter would
threaten to swallow up all of a union's contractual promises in
the name of solidarity.90 Unless the employer were to sue to
enjoin disciplinary proceedings, employees would effectively be
denied relief for union breaches of contract.91
This effective denial of employee relief, through the inter-
position of the fair representation standard in employee-union
contract disputes, would clearly threaten a major objective of
national labor policy: the protection and promotion of the na-
tional economy and of industrial tranquility.92" Unions could rest
content in the knowledge that their promises to employees could
be violated at will. Inevitably, they would become less attuned to
the desires of their entire membership, and responsive to the will
of a majority. Internal disunity would be promoted. Only by
recognition of employee-union suits to enforce collective bar-
gaining promises-subject to ordinary breach of contract
standards-can courts safeguard the rights of employees, and
realistically hope to effectuate national labor policy and deter
disruptive and economically harmful union conduct.
Concern for protection of workers' rights is an important
and independent aspect of federal labor policy. Given a union's
acknowledged role as "fiduciary," the breach of specific union
promises to members is no less intolerable when relating to the
negotiation or administration of a collective bargaining agree-
ment than when such promises relate solely to employee-union
matters. 93 The subordination of employee interests which would
result in such cases if the fair representation remedy were the
exclusive avenue of relief appears quixotic, considering the
ready availability of a traditional theory which would afford
employees added protection. Nonrecognition of an employee
breach of contract remedy because of the existence of the fair
representation duty would mean that a duty designed to har-
monize employee rights and union organizational objectives
90 The fact that the Buzzard employer would have a valid cause of action against the
union for breach of contract would, of course, be of no assistance to an employee in
proving the union's conduct sufficiently arbitrary to constitute a breach of the fair
representation duty. Mere establishment of such a breach would certainly fall short of the
"intentional and severe" discrimination required by the Supreme Court in Amalgamated
Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971).
" See text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
1
2 See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT OF 1947, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 15-16 (1947).
9 See text accompanying notes 73-79 supra.
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would operate perversely, protecting illegitimate union conduct
at the expense of the clear contractual rights of employees.
III. CONCLUSION
Section 301 should not be construed to authorize employees
to bring fair representation suits, not annexed to breach of
contract suits, in federal district courts. The right of an employee
to sue his union for breach of contract under that section,
however, seems well-supported by the words of the statute, the
clear preponderance of the case law and the logic of federal
labor policy. The duty of fair representation is. at best a fragile
instrument of worker protection policy. To expand the duty to
include purely intraunion conduct unrelated to employee job
interests, or to preclude employees from pursuing traditional
contractual remedies, would ironically be to confer upon a union
undeserved discretion to ignore contracts made with or for the
benefit of its members. This would tend to defeat federal policy,
which has been to give maximum protection to worker interests
while promoting industrial stability.
